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BEYOND WHAT IS GIVEN AS GIVENS: 
PROMISES AND THREATS OF SELF-REFLECTIVE RESEARCH 
Torill Strand 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Preliminary findings of an ongoing project on the social constructions of educational 
beliefs within early childhood education in Norway seem to go beyond the given 
conceptions of these beliefs. As a non-conformist ethos of anti-educational beliefs has been 
revealed, it may be taken that the project has succeeded in going beyond what is given as 
givens. Or should it rather be interpreted as an elegant way of legitimising the 
researcher’s own interests and assumptions? Using the project as an example, this article 
argues for the necessity of performing self-reflective sociology, while pointing out the 
inescapable paradoxes, promises and threats of self-reference. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the same way as the French philosopher Jacques Derrida tongue-in-cheek asserts that „I 
only have one language; it is not mine‟ (Derrida, 1998 p. 1), I would like to argue that „we - as 
researchers in early childhood education - only have one epistemology; it is not ours.‟ The 
point of this playful deliberation is to question the ways in which research within early 
childhood education may be characterised as sublimated performances of symbolic power. 
The assumption is that research is never neutral: our research will inevitably intervene; both 
in the discourse of early childhood education and in the discourse on the educational 
discourse. 
In 1992 Derrida gave a lecture at the University of Oslo (which was later revised and 
published (Derrida 1998) under the title „Monolinguism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis of 
Origin‟). Entering the jam-packed auditorium I waded through a sea of enthusiastic listeners 
who were happily sitting on the floor, leaning against the walls or crammed together in the 
doorways. I noticed a few grey-haired philosophers, linguists and sociologists, but mostly 
young students. Suddenly, out of the huge crowd by the back door, I heard a cheerful shout: 
„Hi Torill!‟ It was little Hilde from my kindergarten, now grown into an eager first year 
university student, obviously enjoying herself as she stood squeezed together with a bunch of 
young, curious and engaged Derrida-listeners. 
It was somewhat moving meeting Hilde that day. Not as a sign of the years passing by, 
finding myself among the middle-aged grown-ups. Rather by the gradual realisation, during 
our conversation immediately after the lecture, that Hilde had grasped something I just dimly 
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perceived. The discussion made me even more humble towards young people‟s good 
judgment, and even more curious about Derrida‟s project. What was his message? And do I as 
a researcher in early childhood education have any lessons to learn from him? 
In this article I will not perform an exegesis of Derrida‟s philosophy. I will rather let some of 
his thoughts inspire my deliberation on the ways in which research on early childhood 
education is – and has always been – situated in the crossroads of non-reflective logic, utopian 
polemics and intellectual acrobatics. The focus is the role of the researcher as she or he is 
situated outside and inside the practices studied. The question is in which ways the 
researcher‟s beliefs may contribute to a distorted, limiting, or narrow description of early 
childhood education. The question however is not whether, but rather in which ways and to 
what extent, research in early childhood education may be characterised as „symbolic 
violation‟ (Bourdieu 1991). 
The first part of this article points at Derrida‟s appeal for the necessity of „respecting the 
respect of the respectable‟ (Derrida, 1998 p. 40) with my own project on „The Epistemology 
of Early Childhood Education‟ taken as an example for the performance of self-reflective 
sociology. Next, the paradox of self-reference is discussed, revealing the ways in which a 
showdown of symbolic violence is inevitably dependent on the use of symbolic power. 
Summing up, the last part of the article points at the inescapable paradoxes, promises and 
threats of self-reference. 
 
RESEARCH AS INTERVENTION 
When questioned about his message and the lessons to be learned, Derrida refuses to give a 
clear answer. In an interview with Francois Ewald he strongly rejects having ever had any 
„fundamental project.‟ And adds: „…deconstructions, which I prefer to say in the plural, has 
no doubt never named a project, a method or a system. Especially not a philosophical system‟ 
(Derrida, 2001 p. 67). Nevertheless, it is possible to trace some intentions in Derrida.  
FE One can put it another way: Is there a philosophy of Jacques Derrida? 
JD No. 
FE Therefore there is no message. 
JD No message. 
FE Is there anything normative? 
JD Of course there is, there is nothing but (Derrida, 2001 p. 71). 
Derrida thus admits everything being normative in Derrida. He rejects any fundamental 
project, any method, and any philosophical system. But he admits to continuously perform 
intervening deconstructions with the intention of turning our collective myths and fables 
upside down and inside out. In another interview he admits that „…deconstruction, I have 
insisted, is not neutral. It intervenes’ (Derrida 1981:93). Richard Bernstein (1993) may 
therefore be right in claiming that Derrida‟s ethical-political horizon is a point of departure for 
understanding Derrida‟s writings, such as when he refers to western philosophy as white 
mythology (Derrida 1982), when he questions logocentrism (Derrida 1983), ethnocentrism 
(Derrida 1986), and any form of political dogmatism (Derrida 1994). Bernstein holds that 
Derrida‟s call is a call for responsibility. A claim in which Derrida seems to agree: „… what I 
am saying is not normative in the ordinary sense of the term […]. What I have just suggested 
about responsibility points instead to a law, towards an imperative injunction to which one 
must eventually respond without a norm, without, at the present time, a presentable 
normativity or normality…‟ (Derrida, 2001 p. 71). 
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Derrida‟s ethical-political horizon thus influences his deconstructions of ethics and politics. 
But deconstructions also stand out as ethical-political actions aiming at intervention and 
critique: The point is to deflate any doctrine - ethical, political or epistemological - as they 
may undermine or hinder „the respect of the respectable‟ (Derrida, 1998 p. 40). This may be 
the reason why Derrida so strongly rejects having a project; because the commitment to a 
project presupposes recognition of some kind of doctrine. But in which ways may Derrida‟s 
call challenge research on early childhood education? 
‘I only have one language; it is not mine.’ 
The opening phrase in Derrida‟s lecture – „I only have one language; it is not mine‟ - is 
autobiographical (Derrida, 1998 p. 1). Growing up as a French Jew in Algeria, Derrida 
learned to speak neither Yiddish nor Arabic. He went to a French school, and French was the 
only language spoken in his family. The monolinguism made him a solitary child; a stranger 
to Arab playmates and the Jewish community alike. Even towards the French culture, he felt 
like a foreigner. As a French citizen he learned to speak, think, play, work, communicate, and 
live his life through the French language. But he was neither inside nor outside the French, 
but rather on its outer edge. The experience of being on the boundary was amplified when he, 
as a 19-year old first year university student, for the very first time visited France. He was 
highly surprised, and to some extent offended by the way the Parisian students used and 
abused the language. He even felt upset by the manner in which they twisted and distorted it: 
„Yes, I only have one language, yet it is not mine‟ (Derrida, 1998 p. 2). 
In the same way as Derrida, I venture to say that I – as a researcher – only have one 
epistemology, yet it is not mine. As a researcher I have used a socio-pragmatic epistemology 
to examine the ways in which educational beliefs – the epistemology of Norwegian early 
childhood education – are socially generated, sustained and justified through social practices 
and positioning. I found that Charles Sanders Peirce‟s pragmatism in combination with Pierre 
Bourdieu‟s socio-cultural theory of practice provided an excellent tool for performing a 
sophisticated analysis. Peirce and Bourdieu both underline the unity of thought and action, 
they both use the notion of habit(u)s when describing the ways in which meaning is closely 
related to everyday experience, and they both maintain that the epistemology must be 
regarded as „common sense’ and „social practice.‟  
The term habit(u)s denotes a set of culturally acquired dispositions that generate and structure 
social practices and representations, including „scientific‟ ways of thinking and acting: Our 
world-view, belief system, values and ways of thinking and acting are all products of our 
habit(u)s. As a modernist, Peirce explicitly questions the fact that habits often function as a 
guiding principle for scientific practices. He points to the problem that new knowledge can 
only be generated through progressive breach of conventional ways of thinking. Despite the 
fact that he acknowledges habits as fruitful tools in a continual development of knowledge, he 
stresses the need to play by chance; to perform a type of discontinued ruptures, resulting from 
radical breaks with traditional and conformist ways of thought (Anderson 1987, Peirce 1877, 
1903). Habitus is also a key concept for Bourdieu, and a tool with which to analyse the 
sociological and the socio-cultural production of knowledge (Bourdieu 1977, 1980, 1997). 
However, as scientific knowledge is also inevitably a social product, generated through the 
dialectic relationship between the research object and the subject performing the research, 
Bourdieu points out the danger of the researcher projecting her own prejudices, intermingling 
her own interests with those of the object. He thus calls for a systematic self-reflection in 
order to break with habitual ways of seeing (Bourdieu 1988, 1990, 1992). Research on early 
childhood education should therefore be self-reflective, as a systematic self-reflectivity is the 
only way to avoid conventional thinking. 
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EPISTEMOLOGICAL VIGILANCE 
My habit(u)s as a Norwegian early childhood educator has undoubtedly effected my way of 
performing research. My personal and intellectual biographies, my educational beliefs, my 
prejudices, my personal style and interests have influenced the framing and description of the 
epistemology – or epistemologies – of early childhood education in Norway. Taking the fact 
that I am embedded in, and to some degree spokesperson for, some epistemological cultures 
and traditions it is pertinent to ask to what degree my object of study has been a projection of 
my own intentions, interests and aspirations. As a trained pre-school teacher with teaching 
experience from the kindergarten, and as a lecturer at Oslo University College teaching 
student teachers, I certainly speak the language of Norwegian early childhood education. 
However, when performing professional research seeking non-conventional knowledge of 
Norwegian early childhood education, that language should not be the only language to use. 
In order to demystify the collective myths I – as an agent in the field – am myself embedded 
in, upholding and legitimising, I need to disrupt my habitual practices and representations. 
Without being able to perform epistemic ruptures, my research work will never be able to go 
beyond what is given as givens. 
This is Bourdieu‟s argument, when he calls for epistemological vigilance through a systematic 
„reflection on reflection‟ (Bourdieu 1990). For him, the aim is to limit the damages of a 
narrowing vision and to take our blind spots seriously: because the ways we see define what 
we see, and we are able to see only when we understand that there is something we cannot 
see. Bourdieu thus wants to differentiate between practical knowledge and scientific 
knowledge, or in other words, between habitus-based practices as object of study and the 
researcher‟s non-habitus based research (Bourdieu 1992). Following Bourdieu I thus needed 
to take into account both types of knowledge; the one as a type of practical knowledge which 
was the object of my study and the other as a basis for my research work. 
However, since my object of study was not entirely „the other‟s‟ habitus-based practices, but 
rather a constructed object which came into being through a dialectic relationship between me 
and my object, my habit(u)s was inevitably part of the construction. I therefore needed to do 
my best to liberate myself from my culturally based judgements through a systematic self-
reflection, using the theoretical and methodological tools on myself, my social position and 
my habitual ways of seeing (Bourdieu 1988, 1992). First, I endeavoured to look objectively at 
my own social position – as I found myself situated both inside and outside the social field 
studied – by considering the social field which defines both my position and my interpretation 
of this position. Second, I had to look objectively at my own intentions by applying such 
objectivity – meaning the intention of performing quality research according to some external 
standards – and at the same time try to avoid the temptation to use the latent power intrinsic in 
my academic language and scientific knowledge. Third, my possibility to limit myself from 
my own prejudices depended on the degree of objectivity with which I was able to look at the 
interests that had formed my academic career, my position within the academic milieu and my 
research practice, meaning the social forces and desires influencing my academic and 
personal biographies. When I endeavoured to expose my own research interests, the 
exposition included the habit(u)s implicit in my choice of theoretical perspective, approach 
and methods, as well as the ethical and political interests I had inherited through my social 
positions within, outside and in between the social fields of early childhood education and 
academia. 
The aim with this systematic self-reflection was to limit the symbolic violation performed by 
my research and avoid the danger of concealing the epistemologies of Norwegian early 
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childhood education. I wanted to reveal some hidden logics of practice and to demystify some 
collective myths and fables. My self-reflective sociology may therefore to some extent be 
characterised as an emancipating project, aiming at unveiling the social production, 
performance and reproduction of symbolic power. However, several contradictions popped 
up: first, a showdown of dominant epistemologies necessarily had to be based on a 
constructed dualism between a strictly scientific rationale and a habitus-based epistemology, a 
dualism which may seem deceptive. Second, a deflation of the symbolic power of research 
inevitably had to be based on the power potential within the language and methods of 
research: my systematic procedures of epistemological vigilance could therefore easily be 
transformed into epistemological violence. Thus it seemed impossible to foresee ways of 
avoiding the abuse of symbolic power.  
When it comes to the impossible distinction between habitus-based practices as the object of 
study and the researcher‟s non-habitus based research, Bourdieu is inspired by the French 
philosopher Gaston Bachelard. Bachelard calls for science to break with common sense: in 
quality research, habitual and non-reflective logics and languages of practice are translated 
and transformed into the logics and languages of science. He holds that these transitions from 
everyday language to a language of research amount to radical epistemological breaks that 
may overcome some epistemological obstacles (Bachelard 1968, Bourdieu, Chamboredon and 
Passeron 1991, Tiles 1984). As such, the discourse of research presupposes some epistemic 
ruptures. The very same concern is found in Peirce, as he calls for individual, private and 
habitual beliefs to be adjusted and validated through the consensus of the inquiring 
community (Apel 1995). Nevertheless, the language of science is inevitably influenced by 
tradition and culture, and will always reflect habitual ways of thinking and acting (Bachelard 
1964, Bourdieu 1988, Peirce 1877). The concepts, theories, techniques and values of research 
will thus unavoidably mirror common world-views, values, and ways of categorising. 
Consequently, Peirce stresses the preliminary and fallible character of scientific knowledge as 
„objective descriptions‟ are never given, but rather an ideal to strive for. Accordingly, 
Bachelard and Bourdieu state systematic self-reflectivity as a necessary condition for 
research. In order to go beyond what is given as givens, considerate research should always be 
paired with vigilant self-reflectivity. In sum, Bachelard, Bourdieu and Peirce point to the 
impossible distinction between everyday language and the language of research: on the one 
hand, social research should break with common sense and habitual beliefs. On the other 
hand, common sense and habitual beliefs are inevitably embedded in the logics and language 
of research.  
 
THE IMPOSSIBLE PARADOXES OF SELF-REFERENCE 
It is thus pertinent to ask to what degree a showdown of symbolic violence has to be based on 
– and thus accept – symbolic power. To what degree will emancipatory social research, that is 
research aiming at exposing abuse of symbolic power, in fact be dependent on such abuse 
itself? Taking my own project as an example, I have deliberately „... armed myself with 
reason‟ (Bourdieu, 1990 p. 32) in order to put every aspect straight. In order to do my very 
best to avoid some sublime performances of symbolic power I included a systematic self-
reflective procedure in the project design.  
The design consisted of four phases, each phase representing different levels of analysis. In 
the first phase I first wrote a self-reflective essay on my research interest, my social position, 
assumptions and expected findings. Then, based on Pierre Bourdieu‟s theory of practice, I 
thoroughly constructed a notion of the social field in which the educational beliefs of early 
childhood education are continuously generated and justified. Based on a hypothesis that the 
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syllabuses at the nineteen Teacher‟s University Colleges in Norway represent the canonised – 
or in other words, recognised and authorised – beliefs, I created a database on the compulsory 
reading lists from every Teacher‟s University College in two different years of study. The 
reading lists gave access to the topographical productions and distributions of the current 
epistemology, the issues at stake, and the most influential social agents and institutions. In 
short, I found that the teachers/lecturers at the Teacher‟s University Colleges produce most of 
the current epistemology. Also there appeared to be a clear demarcation between this field and 
other fields of knowledge, as I found an extended exchange of literature between the colleges, 
but relatively little import from other national and international fields. 
In the second phase of the research, I aimed at a more nuanced description of the field, the 
themes and the positioning by interviewing the current „prophets‟. In order to analyze 
systematically my own contribution, I was also interviewed by the same interview guide as 
the „prophets.‟ The „prophets‟ interviewed were the most read authors, i.e. the authors who 
verbalised the most recognised beliefs. ‟ The „prophets‟ were both men and women. Their 
intellectual biographies, their conceptions of qualitative early childhood education, and their 
utopias and dystopies on behalf of the field confirmed the relatively weak social position of 
this field compared to a larger field of knowledge. Despite the great differences between 
them, most of the prophets had entered the field from external fields, and used this field as a 
field of possibilities. They were all aware of how their books contribute to define and preserve 
the current epistemology. In sum the prophets were quite clever at playing the game of early 
childhood education, meaning the play about the content, the limits, and the rules of the game. 
Concerning the epistemology, I found no central themes or consistent universal beliefs. 
However, reading the findings against educational policy, traditions and culture, it seemed 
that the field is producing and constituted by a common interest in children‟s upbringing and a 
stance against „schooling.‟ In this way, the canonised beliefs seem to be constructed by and 
legitimised through a non-conformist ethos of child-centred anti-educational beliefs. 
The third phase was based on the assumption that the „opponents,‟ contrary to the prophets, 
might reveal a more detached view of the game played within the field, and the collective 
myths defining, and defined by, this game. The „opponents‟ were the less read textbook 
authors, speaking the language of Norwegian early childhood education as they were either 
trained as pre-school teachers or teaching/lecturing in one of the Teacher‟s University 
Colleges. The „opponents‟ were all women. In short, they questioned the viability of the field, 
picturing it as a marginalised, alienating, or threatened field of knowledge. One opponent 
asserted that in a few years the Teacher‟s Colleges will be closed down, as there will be no 
need for specialised pre-school teachers. Another questioned the way in which the field 
monopolised certain alienating types of knowledge by demarcating boundaries between a 
literary and a popular way of thinking. A third maintained that the traditional feminine, 
harmonising and family-oriented nurturing logic produced and upheld by the field represents 
a great internal threat, as it may undermine the possibility of change, development and 
progress. 
The point of the fourth phase was to test the results by systematically analyzing and 
questioning my role as researcher and the preliminary findings of the project. Here, I 
performed an exploring focus group interview, where the „prophets‟ met the „opponents‟. I 
also systematically analysed the self-reflective text written in the first phase and the interview 
of myself performed in the second phase. Among other things, I told the interviewer that my 
utopian image of the field was the opposite of a „secret cloister garden,‟ in which the activities 
are hidden behind high walls and narrow gates meant to close the world outside, because „… 
those enclosed discourses are very negative, they can become quite destructive after a while.‟ 
The focus group confirmed the image of a somewhat detached field and agreed on the 
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assumption that the common „mythology‟, such as the myth of „the better childhood,‟ „the 
professional pre-school teacher,‟ or „teaching as a call,‟ is a way of upholding the field and 
keeping it together. 
In evaluating the project‟s data I found: first that the social game of Norwegian early 
childhood education is about demarcating the field from other social fields of education; 
second that the social game seems to be about generating a collective belief in the game; third 
that the basis of the epistemology thus seems to be nothing more than this common belief 
itself. Thus, the ethos of Norwegian early childhood education comes forward as a defiant 
rebellion against other ways of educational beliefs and practices. Next, the interior 
demarcation between „we‟ and the „other‟ seems notably significant together with a 
conformist approval of the collective beliefs in the game. Consequently, my findings go 
beyond the common assumption that Norwegian early childhood education first of all is based 
on a romantic notion of the child, paired with progressive educational beliefs. On the contrary, 
they seem to verify that the field is based on, upheld by, and continuously strengthening a 
non-conformist, rebellious ethos of anti-educational beliefs. However, it is pertinent to 
question to what degree the findings reflect and confirm my own interests and assumptions. 
By including a systematic self-reflection – or a „reflection on reflection‟ – as a part of the 
project I attempted to carry out a responsible, reliable research as I did my very best to avoid 
using or abusing symbolic power. But to what degree is it possible to disentangle from the 
paradoxes of self-reference? When, in this project, I refer to my private and intellectual 
biography, my social position, my personal and professional interests, and myself, I can never 
be sure that my self-reference is beyond suspicion: that it does not contribute to undermining 
rather than strengthening the project. First, the act of employing the research tools on myself 
is likely to be conceived – by people concerned with distance, objectivity and traditional 
scientific endeavour – as a narcissistic, rebellious, non-scientific, or non-conformist rejection 
of the common rules and procedures of research. Second, my self-reflection may also be read 
as an attempt to diminish the critique of my own project. Third, such a systematic self-
reference may also undermine the reliability of the project by diverting the attention towards 
less important elements. Consequently, my systematic self-reference may therefore be read as 
an example of the impossible paradoxes of self-reference, as the intention to act with 
epistemological vigilance may easily be turned upside down and inside out.  
‘We never speak only one language…’ 
It seems like an inescapable dilemma that we, in our wish to avoid the misuse of symbolic 
power, often experience the ways in which epistemological programs and procedures 
contribute to conceal, rather than reveal, the object studied. Consequently, it seems impossible 
to calculate the possibility of avoiding symbolic power, as the programmatic call for 
epistemological vigilance may easily hinder or deflate the „…respect of the respectable‟ 
(Derrida, 1998 p. 40).  
In his lecture in Oslo in 1992 Derrida claimed that „I only have one language; it is not mine‟ 
(Derrida, 1998 p. 1). As a French citizen growing up in Algeria he learned only French. He 
was monolingual. Even so, he did not consider the French spoken in France as his mother 
tongue. In the same way, many of us may in fact claim that we are monolingual. Nevertheless, 
despite the fact that we are monolingual, we are naturally able to speak several languages. For 
on the one hand it is true that we are monolingual. At the same time, it is a fact that „we never 
speak only one language‟ (Derrida, 1998 p. 10), as language denotes belonging to, and for 
some identification with, a community, a group, a culture, or a nation. And as social agents 
inscribed in complex and multilayered social settings, most of us actually belong to a number 
of „language‟ communities: already as small children we easily move in and out of various 
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social contexts and forms of practices. Take the example of the four-year-old who easily 
copes with the various forms of practices at home, in the day-care centre and with grandma.  
In other words, Derrida believes that we never speak only one language. As a child and a 
teenager Derrida was monolingual. But the assertion that he spoke only one language is rather 
misleading. It is true that he only spoke French; nevertheless he was neither within nor 
without the French. He was on the outer edge; between Yiddish and French, Arabic and 
French, between the colonialist and the colonialised. He was familiar and a stranger; he was a 
hostage and a guest. On the one hand, the French language represented a demand for 
traditionalism and conformism; on the other hand a possibility of change and the crossing of 
boundaries. Accordingly, French – whether it was about language, culture or citizenship – 
simultaneously represented a limitation and a possibility. 
In other words, language should be conceived as a unique place and a unique starting point 
representing limitations and possibilities, hindrances and openings, threats and promises. 
Because, as Derrida says: „…one cannot speak of language except in that language‟ (Derrida, 
1998 p. 12), and in this he uses his own story as an example. When claiming that on the one 
hand he is monolingual and on the other hand speaks many languages, Derrida is telling his 
life story. In this, the French language – as a tool – was a unique place and starting point. But 
by telling his story he is in fact not only creating his own autobiography, but also our 
understanding of his biography. As such he actively intervenes in the world; not only in his 
own biography, but also in our understanding of his biography. Our new knowledge of his life 
influences our understanding of our own. Consequently he also intervenes in our biographies. 
His story is in no way neutral. It intervenes, both in his life and ours. 
In the same manner, my research on early childhood education cannot be neutral because it 
will inevitably intervene: both in the discourse of Norwegian early childhood education, and 
in the discourse on the discourse. My epistemology is in fact the only tool I have, as it is 
impossible to describe an epistemology other than through this epistemology. Or, to 
paraphrase Derrida:‟…one cannot have knowledge about knowledge except through that 
knowledge.‟ In this way, my research on early childhood education is a discourse on the 
discourse that may both become a promise and a threat.  
 
THE INESCAPABLE PARADOXES, PROMISES AND THREATS OF SELF-
REFERENCE 
As my research on the epistemologies of early childhood education is producing a discourse 
on the discourse, I must be epistemologically vigilant. The point is to avoid my un-reflected 
logic, utopian polemic or intellectual acrobatics to influence or overshadow the 
epistemologies studied. But as it seems impossible to untangle myself from my own un-
reflected logic of practice, an objective description becomes an impossible ideal. Another 
problem is that a deflation of symbolic violence necessarily has to be based on the acceptance 
and use of symbolic power. In other words, an epistemological vigilance – in the shape of an 
epistemological doctrine and a systematic self-reflective procedure – may just as well hide as 
illuminate the epistemologies studied. On the whole, it seems rather impossible to avoid 
symbolic violation.  
It is however important to emphasise that an epistemological vigilance not only represents a 
threat, but also a promise. Our epistemology, whether representing a „habit(u)al‟ 
understanding or a „scientific‟ understanding, is the only language we share. On the one hand 
it is impossible to describe an epistemology without that epistemology. It is impossible to 
produce knowledge other than through that knowledge. On the other hand we have many 
epistemologies and wide-ranging knowledge. For in the same manner as I am situated within, 
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outside and between early childhood education and academia, my epistemology will 
necessarily be able to move elegantly and self-assuredly within, outside and between the 
academia and my profession. My epistemology – and my epistemologies – thus represents 
both many limitations and many possibilities. On the one hand, it is a problem that I blindly 
support an epistemological program, or perform a one-sided intellectual acrobatic in terms of 
a formal procedure to ensure that I do not commit abuse of power. On the other hand, it is my 
epistemology – or epistemologies – that provides the only possibility I have to transcend and 
change, and thus to create a reliable discourse on the discourse within Norwegian early 
childhood education. 
It is in other words, as Derrida says, exactly „…the respect of the respectable‟ that is at stake, 
and such reliability or credibility cannot solely be secured through an epistemological 
doctrine, an intellectual procedure or a methodological acrobatic. On the contrary, Derrida 
believes that when reliability is challenged, we are challenged to the opposite, as the 
experience of being considered as reliable is to experience the impossible. The impossible 
paradox of unbiased research is the fact that being true to one‟s own beliefs presupposes 
openness towards other ways of knowing. Derrida thus argues for an ethical-political 
commitment to a double, paradoxical and conflicting logic. Consequently, reliable research 
cannot simply be a question of technique or formal procedures. Rather, „…certain „madness‟ 
must watch over each and every step … as reason does also‟ (Derrida, 2001 p. 72). Logic of 
irresponsible responsibility must therefore go together with a rational thoughtfulness, as we 
can never in advance guarantee that our dedication to an epistemological reliability will 
contribute to reliable research results. In other words, we have to commit ourselves to 
hospitability, acceptance, and deep respect of the object studied. Or, as Derrida expressed at 
the University in Oslo in 1992; this is about „respecting the respect of the respectable.‟ But at 
the same time, he emphasised that there are no neutral standards here. There are no mutual 
goals provided by a neutral third party, because this type of respect, this type of hospitability, 
has to be created anew each time. And precisely therefore a certain madness, a dedication to 
an irresponsible responsibility must watch over each and every step in our research practice. 
In fact, certain madness must watch over our thinking alongside with reason. 
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